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FOREWORD
There is perhaps no area of public policy which has received as much attention
in recent years as that dealing with the enforcement practices and policies of law
enforcement agencies. Despite--or, perhaps, as a result of-the intensity of the
inquiry into these matters, it has become increasingly dear that some very fundamental questions remain unresolved. One issue of this nature involves the increasingly articulated demand for the establishment of mechanisms to increase police
accountability for enforcement practices. The area of dispute on this question has
only been refined to a recognition that there is considerable, but by no means
universal, dissatisfaction with the manner in which the police fulfill their function.
The debate concerning the need for increased accountability has not been
purely theoretical. A wide range of approaches from the past and the present are
available for scrutiny. For example, there is considerable historical evidence, particularly from the early part of this century, of the effects of resorting to direct
political control of the police. That experience, reflected in the recommendations
of the Wickersham Commission, provides a heavy underscoring of the potential
for abuse which exists in a system which places substantial control over departmental
personnel and enforcement policies in the hands of elected officials. While the reaction to that earlier experience produced some desirable innovations such as the
introduction of civil service criteria in personnel matters, it paved the way for the
evolution of highly autonomous enforcement units. After the reforms, the institutional structure at the local government level often did not provide, as a matter
of either practice or law, a mechanism for the input of corrective influences.
Although some corrupting political controls continued in this stage, the defect
which, in the view of critics of the police, has become predominate is the insensitivity
of departments in effectuating enforcement policies. Because those subjected to
these policies were typically quite impotent to raise a collective challenge, critics
contend, we have experienced a lengthly period of improperly conceived police
efforts.
/

The bitter experiences of the prior era of political control undoubtedly creates
a substantial dilemma for many of those who perceive a need for reform. While
some outside inputs into the department appear to be desirable, any reform aimed
toward that end raises the spectre of political corruption. Innovations in several
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forms have been attempted, but none has yet proved to have the durability or
acceptability which could be expected to produce universal adoption.
When a response was not forthcoming from other institutions, the United States
Supreme Court initiated the refinement and expansion of the exclusionary rule.
The rule seemed justifiable on the basis of a number of practical and legal considerations, but one of its primary foundations was the apparent absence of
alternative means to control police insensitivity to the need to observe basic
freedoms. Other doctrinal shifts by the -Court insured that questions of police
practices became a central concern to courts at all levels. These in turn resulted
in increased attention being given to other remedies for police misconduct such as
injunction and damages suits. The expanded role of the judiciary in this area, now
supported by several years of recent experiences, raises a fundamental question: is
the judiciary equipped to play the predominate role in ensuring police accountability?
Upon examination of that question, a number of limitations on the judicial capacity
appear. First, there are significant limitations on the types of sanctions which the
judiciary can invoke against the police. While the increased use of injunctive and
damages remedies represents an important innovation, there is presently very little
the judiciary can do to affect particular routine departmental decisions in areas such
as those involving enforcement policy and personnel matters. Second, and relatedly,
an effective system of accountability seemingly requires that supervision be administrative in nature to insure that inputs are both consistent and readily available.
While the judiciary has increasingly assumed administrative functions-as in the
area of school desegregation-continued attempts to impose such duties will eventually confront the limitations inherent in the institutional structure of the judiciary.
Finally, it can be expected that in the long run the judiciary would not be as
responsive in effectuating community demands for accountability as would other
institutions, for it is questionable whether the judiciary can provide a continuingly
accurate reading of shifts in popular and professional concerns. Thus, while the
necessity of a continuing role for the judiciary is apparent, it is a much different
matter to place sole reliance on that institution.
One source for ensuring increased accountability which has received increasing
attention is the law enforcement agency itself. An increase in departmental policymaking offers an alternative to reliance on other institutional forms. The innovations
at the departmental level include the development of policy-making organs which
are both more dearly defined and more broadly based than in the past. In addition,
the scope of departmental decision-making has assumed new dimensions, particularly
with the emphasis on the formulation of rules to guide the conduct of field personnel.
The significance of these efforts can be easily undervalued. Some will argue
that enforcement units have always engaged in policy-making and, if past experience
serves as a guide, their approach cannot be expected to produce satisfactory solutions.
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An appropriate rejoinder is that past experience may not be particularly reliable
in this instance, for departments presently operate under incentives markedly different from those of the past. Decision-making is presently made in a context which includes a judiciary more willing to assert control over police practices. Similarly,
concern from those outside the department about the way the department is run
is more generalized as well as more vocal than in the past. Because departmental
decisions are now more apt to be subjected to public scrutiny, the decision-making
process is likely to take account of this factor.
But even if the departments themselves can be expected to assume a more
affirmative role, two important questions remain. The first is whether our experience
in the early part of this century will continue to dictate substantial limitations on
resort to control mechanisms of a popular--or political-nature. The second issue
is whether the role of the judiciary will be redirected to any meaningful extent. This
latter issue can be approached quite indirectly. Some would continue to support
efforts to lessen the judicial role through either the legislative or executive appointment process. It seems, however, that a proper allocation of effort would not invoke
such controls, but would nonetheless result in the de facto realignment of the role
of the judiciary. As institutions other than the judiciary-including political institutions as well as the departments themselves-assume a more active posture in
providing for accountability, the position of the judiciary will necessarily change.
While it can be hoped the judiciary would continue to offer an avenue for review
of certain varieties of police conduct, it would no longer exclusively bear the weight
of policy judgments-and public controversy.
Because it is extremely difficult to secure a dispassionate debate on the desirability of political mechanisms for securing police responsiveness, considerable
credit must be given to the Advisory Committee of the Police Functions of the
American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice. The Committee approached all facets of the issue of police accountability and recommended
a number of standards which attempt to encourage a rethinking of the present
role of the police while accommodating a range of diverse points of view. One
recommendation, Standard 2z.5, deals with the relationship of the police to the local
government officials. The conclusion reached is that "the chief executive of a
municipality should be recognized as having the ultimate responsibility for his
department" and should participate in departmental decision-making. The Committee's commentary on this standard reflects due regard for the dangers of political
influence. The philosophical position adopted is cautious in its terms: while ultimate
civilian control is endorsed, it is made clear that the local chief executive should
also operate to insulate the police from improper influences from other sources. The
recommendation does, however, accept that a complete isolation of enforcement
agencies from the local government will not likely produce substantial progress
toward lessening the controversy surrounding the police.
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The overall model discussed in the Standards is quite laudable. In addition to
recognizing the desirability of civilian influences, the Standards both accept a
continuing role for the judiciary and encourage expansion of departmental policymaking. The Standards stand as an emphatic statement that increased accountability
will not be achieved through a single institution and that instead, we must recognize
-and accommodate--the respective roles of several different institutions.
It is too much to expect, of course, that the Standards will provide a focal point
for consensus in an area which has been typified by disagreement. It is likely that
the area of police practices will never be one in which approaches receive generalized
approval. The police pursue objectives which are inherently conflicting as they
seek, on one hand, to secure property and persons and, on the other, to preserve our
ideals of fundamental constitutional rights. Shifts in notions of appropriateness in
one category will confront resistance from those who promote the other. And given
the normative nature of the underpinnings of both, such adjustments are likely to be
perpetual. Thus, the process of striving for societal satisfaction with the operation
of the police must be regarded as evolutionary. The only relevant goal then is not
achievement of universally agreeable states of development but rather better definition
of the area of disagreement and increased responsiveness to changing perceptions
of the police function.
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